Introduction
Accounting standards setters in many jurisdictions around the world, including the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and the European Union, have issued standards requiring recognition of balance sheet amounts at fair value, and changes in their fair values in income. For example, in the United States, the Financial Accounting Standards Board requires recognition of some investment securities and derivatives at fair value. In addition, as their accounting rules have evolved, many other balance sheet amounts have been made subject to partial application of fair value rules that depend on various ad hoc circumstances, including impairment (e.g., goodwill and loans) and whether a derivative is used to hedge changes in fair value (e.g., inventories, loans, and fixed lease payments). The Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board (hereafter FASB and IASB) are jointly working on projects examining the feasibility of mandating recognition of essentially all financial assets and liabilities at fair value in the financial statements.
In the US, fair value recognition of financial assets and liabilities appears to enjoy the support the Securities and Exchange Commission (hereafter SEC). In a recent report prepared for a Congressional committee (SEC, 2005) , the Office of the Chief Accountant of the SEC states two primary benefits of requiring fair value accounting for financial instruments. First, it would mitigate the use of accounting-motivated transaction structures designed to exploit opportunities for earnings management created by the current "mixed-attribute"-part historical cost, part fair values-accounting model. For example, it would eliminate the incentive to use asset securitization as a means to recognize gains on sale of receivables or loans. Second, fair value accounting for all financial instruments would reduce the complexity of financial reporting arising from the mixed attributed model. For example, with all financial instruments measured at fair value, the hedge accounting model employed by the FASB's derivatives standard would all but be eliminated, making it unnecessary for investors to study the choices made by management to determine what basis of accounting is used for particular instruments, as well as the need for management to keep extensive records of hedging relationships.
But, as noted in the SEC report, there are costs as well associated with the application of fair value accounting. One key issue is whether fair values of financial statement items can be measured reliably, especially for those financial instruments for which active markets do not readily exist (e.g., specialized receivables or privately placed loans). Both the FASB and IASB state in their Concepts statements that they consider the cost/benefit tradeoff between relevance and reliability when assessing how best to measure specific accounting amounts, and whether measurement is sufficiently reliable for financial statement recognition. A cost to investors of fair value measurement is that some or even many recognized financial instruments might not be measured with sufficient precision to help them assess adequately the firm's financial position and earnings potential. This reliability cost is compounded by the problem that in the absence of active markets for a particular financial instrument, management must estimate its fair value, which can be subject to discretion or manipulation.
Assessing the costs and benefits of fair value accounting for financial reporting to investors and other financial statement users in particular reporting regimes is difficult.
Assessing the costs and benefits of bank regulators mandating fair value accounting for financial institutions for the purpose of assessing a bank's regulatory capital is perhaps even more challenging. The purpose of this paper is to provide some preliminary views on the issues bank regulators face when assessing the costs and benefits of using fair value for determining regulatory capital and making other regulatory decisions. To this end, I begin by reviewing extant capital market studies that examine the usefulness of fair value accounting to investors. I then discuss implementation issues of determining financial instruments' fair values. In doing so, I again look to evidence from the academic literature. Finally, I discuss marking-to-market implementation issues that are of particular relevance to bank regulators as they consider the effects of fair value measurement on bank earnings and capital, and the attendant effects on real managerial decisions.
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Background of Fair Value Accounting in Standard Setting
Definition of Fair Value
The FASB defines "fair value" as "the price at which an asset or liability could be exchanged in a current transaction between knowledgeable, unrelated willing parties" (FASB, 2004a) .
2 As the FASB notes, "the objective of a fair value measurement is to 1 "Marking-to-market" and "fair values" are often used as synonyms. Use of the former implies the existence of active markets with determinable market prices. As described below, "fair value" can have multiple meanings and does not necessarily depend on the existence of active markets. Moreover, even if market prices exist, the instrument's value to the entity need not equal its quoted market price. 2 The IASB defines fair value similarly.
estimate an exchange price for the asset or liability being measured in the absence of an actual transaction for that asset or liability." Implicit in this objective is the notion that fair value is well defined so that an asset or liability's exchange price fully captures its value. That is, the price at which an asset can be exchanged between two entities does not depend on the entities engaged in the exchange and this price also equals the value-in-use to any entity. For example, the value of a swap derivative to a bank equals the price at which it can purchase or sell that derivative, and the swap's value does not depend on the existing assets and liabilities on the bank's balance sheet. For such a bank, notes that this is a strong assumption to make particularly if many of its assets and liabilities cannot readily be traded. I will return to the implications of this problem when discussing implementation of marking-to-market issues below.
Applications to standard setting
In the US, the FASB has issued several standards that mandate disclosure or recognition of accounting amounts using fair values. Among the most significant in terms of relevance to financial institutions are those standards that explicitly relate to financial instruments. (FASB, 1985) requires footnote disclosure of the fair value of pension plan assets and the pension obligation associated with defined benefit plans. However, the standard requires balance sheet recognition of only the net of the unrecognized asset, liability, and equity amounts. The SEC report (SEC, 2005) recommends that pension assets and liabilities be recognized at fair value in the body of the financial statements. Evidence in Landsman (1986) and Barth (1991) Barth, Beaver, and Landsman (1996 ), Eccher, Ramesh, and Thiagarajan (1996 ), and Nelson (1996 use similar approaches to assess the incremental value relevance of fair values of principal categories of banks assets and liabilities disclosed under SFAS No. 107 in 1992 and 1993, i.e., investment securities, loans, deposits, and long-term debt.
8 Another equally plausible explanation is that investment securities' fair value gains and losses are naturally hedged by fair value changes of other balance sheet amounts, which are not included in the estimating equations. Ahmed and Takeda (1995) , which includes other on-balance sheet net assets in the estimating equations, provides support for this explanation by providing evidence of incremental explanatory power for unrecognized securities gains and losses in explaining banks' stock returns.
Supporting the findings of Barth (1994) 
International research
Because Australian and UK GAAP permit upward asset revaluations but, as with US GAAP, require downward revaluations in the case of asset impairments, several studies examine the dimensions of value relevance of revaluations in these countries.
Most studies, including Easton, Eddey, and Harris (1993), Barth and Clinch (1996) , Clinch (1998), and Lin (2000) , focus on tangible fixed asset revaluations. However, Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (1999) to assume the incentive will only increase if fair value accounting is used for recognition of amounts on the balance sheet and in the income statement.
Marking-to-Market Implementation Issues
Marking-to-market financial instruments is relatively easy if they are actively traded in liquid markets. The problem becomes more complicated if active markets do not exist, particularly if the financial instrument is a compound instrument comprising several embedded option-like features, values for which depend on inter-related default and price risk characteristics. Moreover, makes the observation that in the absence of active, liquid markets, fair value is not well defined in the sense that an instrument's acquisition price, selling price, and value-in-use to the entity can differ from each other. 11 Stated another way, even if an instrument's acquisition or selling prices are observable, it these prices can only at best provide upper or lower bounds on its "fair value". The FASB's stated preference for using an instrument's selling price as its measure of fair value is appropriate when fair value is well defined, but is somewhat arbitrary when it is not.
In this section, I discuss issues relating to implementation of fair value estimates when market prices for particular financial instruments are not readily available by focusing on findings from two related studies by Rendleman (1998, 2000) on the use of binomial option pricing models to estimate fair values for corporate debt and its components.
Binomial option pricing of corporate debt
Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (1998) uses a binomial option pricing model to estimate the fair values of corporate debt and its components, i.e., conversion, call, put, and sinking fund features, to provide evidence on the relevance and reliability of estimated fair values. A companion study, Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (2000) , describes details of how the binomial model is implemented. The 1998 empirical study is based on data from 1990 for a sample of 120 publicly traded US firms that have corporate debt with multiple embedded option features. The binomial model the study implements is based on the models of Cox, Ross and Rubinstein (1979) and Rendleman and Bartter (1979) , and considers directly only default risk, but includes information in the interest rate yield curve.
Findings from Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (1998) However, additional evidence in Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (1998) suggests model estimates of total bond value may lack reliability. In particular, when the authors re-estimate bond fair values excluding from the sample those bonds with available market prices (such bonds comprise approximately half of sample bonds), estimated bond values for those bonds that are not publicly traded differ significantly from value estimates when all bonds are included in the estimation procedure. This finding suggests that financial instruments' fair value estimates are sensitive to whether actual market price information from other instruments an entity has on its balance sheet is available to be used as model inputs. Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (1998) reaches several conclusions regarding limitations to implementation of binomial option pricing models for estimating bond fair values that generalize to all financial instruments issued or held by an entity. First, the authors had to make several educated guesses for values of model inputs (e.g., conversion schedules and equity volatility). In principle, managers of the reporting entities likely have access to better information than financial statement users (including academic researchers), and the authors suggest that fair value estimates could improve if firms were required to disclose them. Second, models quickly become too complex and difficult to implement if they are to consider all of the dimensions of risk and value that can affect an instrument's fair value. For example, presently, few models consider both interest rate and default risk. In addition, financial instruments' fair values are interdependent. For example, the fair value of one debt instrument issued by an entity is dependent upon actions that holders of another debt instrument issued by that entity can take. The model Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (1998) implements considers some sources of bond value interdependence (e.g., debt priority) but basically ignores the issue because of its complexity. The issue of financial instruments' value interdependence is another illustration of the issue raised by that a financial instrument's fair value may not be well defined (e.g., its selling price may not equal its value-in-use to the entity).
Manipulation of model inputs
Having to rely on managers' model estimates of financial instruments' fair values introduces the general problem of informational asymmetry-i.e., managers have private information regarding appropriate values to select for model inputs as well the true underlying economic value of a financial instrument to the firm. Informational asymmetry creates two somewhat different problems, adverse selection and moral hazard.
An important implication of adverse selection is that the market will tend to value apparently similar financial instruments held by two different firms similarly when assessing their fair values and the values of the firms' equities. Thus, for example, in the absence of credible and verifiable information, two banks that are otherwise equivalent except one has a higher quality loan portfolio than the other will have their stocks valued similarly by the securities market. A solution to the adverse selection problem is to permit managers of the bank with a higher quality loan portfolio to signal their loans are of higher quality. For the signal to be credible, it must be costly, but less costly for the bank with higher quality loans. This can be achieved, for example, by permitting bank managers to disclose selectively attributes about the loans' fair values that would be too costly for bank managers with low quality loans to disclose.
The problem of moral hazard is that managers will tend to use their private information to their advantage by manipulating the information that they disclose to the securities markets and regulators. In the case of banks, this can lead to mispricing of their stocks and an inaccurate portrayal of their capital ratios and their financial health to bank regulators. As noted above, the findings in Aboody, Barth, and Kasznik (2005) , which indicates that managers select model parameters to manage estimates of disclosed employee stock option fair values, raise the broader question of whether managers will behave similarly when selecting model parameters for fair value estimates of other financial instruments, including those whose values are recognized in the body of the financial statements. The Barth, Landsman, and Rendleman (1998) conclusion that managers can provide better estimates of bond fair values because they have access to private information presumes implicitly that managers apply their private information in a neutral fashion, i.e., they do not succumb to the temptation to manipulate bond fair value estimates for private gain.
If fair value accounting for financial instruments is generally applied for financial statement recognition and regulatory capital determination, accounting standard setters as well as securities and bank regulators face the challenge of determining how much latitude to give managers when they estimate fair values, balancing the benefit of permitting managers to reveal private information, thereby mitigating the adverse selection problem, and the moral hazard cost of their exercising discretion to manipulate earnings or capital ratios when selecting model parameters.
Marking-to-Market: Additional Issues for Bank Regulators
I now turn to discussing additional issues that bank regulators in particular need to consider if they are to require banks to mark-to-market financial instruments when determining regulatory capital and when assessing other dimensions of bank performance.
Fair Values measurement error
The first obvious issue bank regulators face is that fair value estimates of bank assets and liabilities (which are principally financial instruments) are likely to contain measurement error. If the findings in Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen (1995) Of course not all earnings or regulatory capital volatility arising from the application of fair value accounting is the result of measurement error. Barth (2004) makes the observation that there are three primary sources of "extra" volatility associated with fair value-based accounting amounts relative to those determined under historical cost. The first is true underlying economic volatility that is reflected by changes in bank assets' and liabilities' fair value. The second is volatility induced by measurement error in estimates of those fair value changes. The third, induced volatility arising from using a mixed-attribute model, would be less of a concern if all instruments are recognized at fair value. The relevance/reliability tradeoff accounting standard setters consider is certainly applicable to bank regulators. A primary goal of regulators would appear to develop a framework for measuring financial instruments' fair values-and changes in value-so as to maximize the ratio of (a) additional economic volatility in bank earnings (or capital ratios) arising from using fair value accounting instead of historical cost to (b) additional volatility arising from measurement error in fair value estimates. As noted above, a significant dimension to this problem is determining how much discretion to give bank managers when they estimate fair values of their assets and liabilities.
Before leaving the discussion of measurement error, it is important to note that although fair value estimates of bank assets and liabilities likely contain measurement error relative to true economic values, so do book value estimates. Casting the debate in terms of whether fair values are "good" or "bad" is inappropriate. The more appropriate question to ask is whether fair value-based financial statements improve information investors receive relative to information provided by historical cost-based financial statements, and whether regulation of bank capital will be more efficient under one accounting system or the other.
Economic considerations
A natural question to ask is what the real economic consequences will be of accounting standard setters and financial reporting and bank regulators requiring mark-tomarket accounting to measure bank performance and financial condition. The desired outcomes are, of course, greater economic and informational efficiency. However, as noted above, the extent to which these goals are met depends on a variety of factors relating to how the model is implemented (e.g., the amount of discretion managers are granted when selecting fair value model inputs).
One notable implementation issue is whether real economic decisions made by bank managers would improve. On the one hand, managers would have less incentive to use accounting-motivated transaction structures designed to exploit opportunities for income management arising from the current mixed attribute accounting model. On the other hand, extra volatility of fair value income and regulatory capital could cause bank managers to apply a sub-optimal decision rule by selecting investments of lower risk than would be the case if investment decisions were based solely on economic considerations.
The effects on economic and informational efficiency of requiring fair value accounting to measure bank performance and financial condition are likely to vary considerably across countries, reflecting differences in richness of securities markets, legal systems, bank and securities markets regulatory enforcement, and a host of other institutional features. The burgeoning "law and finance" literature (La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1998) suggests that these differences are likely to play an important role in determining the effectiveness of using fair value accounting for financial reporting and bank regulation.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper I identify issues that bank regulators need to consider if they are to use fair value accounting for determining bank regulatory capital and when making regulatory decisions. In the financial reporting arena, the FASB and IASB have issued several disclosure and measurement and recognition standards for financial instruments, and all indications are that it's only a matter of time before both standard setters will mandate recognition of all financial instruments at fair value. To help identify important issues for bank regulators, I briefly review capital market studies that examine the usefulness of fair value accounting to investors, and discuss marking-to-market implementation issues of determining financial instruments' fair values. In doing so, I
identify several key issues. First, regulators need to consider how to let managers reveal private information in their fair value estimates while minimizing strategic manipulation of model inputs to manage income and regulatory capital. Second, they need to consider more broadly how best to minimize measurement error in fair values so as to maximize their usefulness to investors and creditors as they make their investment decisions, and how best to ensure bank managers have incentives to select those investments that maximize economic efficiency of the banking system. Cross-country institutional differences are likely to play an important role in determining the effectiveness of using mark-to-market accounting for financial reporting and bank regulation. 
